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We worked with two microlenders to test impacts of randomly assigned reminders for 
loan repayments in the “text messaging capital of the world”. We do not find strong 
evidence that loss versus gain framing or messaging timing matter. Messages only 
robustly improve repayment when they include the loan officer’s name. This effect 
holds for clients serviced by the loan officer previously but not for first-time 
borrowers. Taken together, the results highlight the potential and limits of 
communications technology for mitigating moral hazard, and suggest that personal 
obligation/reciprocity between borrowers and bank employees can be harnessed to 
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I. Introduction  
We worked with two large Philippine microlenders, Greenbank and Mabitac, to test 
whether and how text message reminders can induce timelier loan repayment in a country 
that has been dubbed the “text messaging capital of the world”.1 Each bank sent 
randomly assigned individual liability borrowers weekly text message reminders about 
their weekly repayment obligation. Additional levels of randomization varied the timing 
and content of the messages across borrowers. The timing treatment varied whether each 
message was sent on the due date, or on one or two days prior to the due date. The 
content treatments varied whether the message mentioned the loan officer’s name, and 
whether the message was framed in loss or gain terms. 
We do not find an overall treatment effect: there is no evidence that the average 
message improved repayment performance relative to the control group. The timing 
treatments do not have significant effects relative to the control group, or significant 
differences from each other. Nor does loss or gain framing produce significant 
improvements relative to the control group, or robustly significant differences from each 
other. 
 We do find that including the loan officer’s name significantly improves repayment over 
relevant horizons. For example, the point estimate suggests that this type of text message 
reduces the likelihood that a loan was unpaid 30 days after maturity by 5.5 percentage 
points, a 41% reduction on a base of 0.135. The effects of mentioning the loan officer’s 
name are only significant for borrowers who entered the study having borrowed from the 
bank (and hence having been serviced by the same loan officer) before and the effects are 
significantly different for pre-existing borrowers compared to first-time borrowers. These 
results have implications for several different aspects of research and practice.  
First, they add to the body of evidence on the existence and magnitude of ex-post 
(limited enforcement) frictions in credit markets (e.g., Adams, Einav, and Levin 2009; 
Karlan and Zinman 2009). The text messages do not change any contract terms between 
the borrower and the bank. Yet messages can induce repayment. This suggests that 
repayment is not fully contractible, and conversely that “repayment effort” (broadly 
                                                
1 See, for example, http://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20100823005660/en/Research-
Markets-Philippines---Telecoms-Mobile-Broadband. Accessed 19 February 2012.  
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defined to include safer project choice, effort as traditionally defined, and/or reduced 
strategic default) is elastic with respect to something other than the contract. 
Second, the results shed some light on why or why not some types of messages might 
reduce ex-post frictions. We start with why not. Most message varieties here do not work, 
and there are only minor textual differences across the different varieties (see Table 1 for 
the scripts). Hence it seems doubtful that the messages here mitigated limited attention as 
a pure reminder, as postulated by the most closely related study.2 Nor does it seems likely 
that the messages provided informative signals about bank enforcement intentions; if that 
were the case, we might expect that all messages (all of which mention the bank name) 
would improve repayment relative to the no-message condition. And we would expect 
that including the loan officer’s name in the message would have (relatively) strong 
effects on first-time borrowers, who probably have less precise expectations about bank 
and loan officer enforcement practices, whereas instead we found the reverse. 
Our results do suggest a role for personal relationships between borrowers and loan 
officers. Perhaps (repeat) borrowers feel indebted (pun intended) to their loan officer, and 
the message triggers feelings of obligation and/or reciprocity (e.g., Cialdini and Goldstein 
2004; Charness and Dufwenberg 2006) that increase repayment effort. This mechanism is 
distinct from the ones studied in the long literature on how soft information acquired by 
bank employees can help improve loan performance by reducing information 
asymmetries. That literature (e.g., Boot 2000; Agarwal et al. 2011) focuses on how 
additional (soft) information improves screening and/or monitoring. In contrast, our 
results suggest that messaging can improve repayment even without obtaining additional 
information on the borrower. 
Third, our results shed light on optimal design of information and communications 
technology-driven development efforts (ICT4D). Research on ICT4D is only in its youth 
(e.g., Aker and Mbiti 2010; Donner 2008; Jack and Suri 2011), so unsurprisingly there 
                                                
2 Cadena and Schoar (2011) randomize whether individual microcredit clients in Uganda were 
sent an SMS, which in most cases was a picture of the bank, three days before each monthly loan 
installment was due. They do not randomize timing or content. Their messages improved timely 
repayment by 7-9% relative to the control group, an effect they benchmark, using pricing 
randomizations, as commensurate with effects of reducing the cost of capital by 25%. Karlan et al 
(2011) and Kast et al (2012) find that text message reminders increase savings deposits among 
microfinance clients in four different banks across four different countries. 
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has been relatively little focus on the mechanics (content, timing, etc.) of 
communications. Our findings suggest that content is critical, even within the constraints 
of a 160-character text message limit. Another interesting question is how technological 
innovations interact with local institutions. E.g., it seems intuitive to expect that, at least 
to some extent, economies of scale in ICT would favor larger, (trans-)national, 
transaction-based institutions over smaller, local, relationship-based institutions. Yet our 
results suggest that properly crafted ICT-based innovations can actually buttress 
relationship lending.  
Our results come with a least two important caveats. One is that most of our null 
results are imprecise; our confidence intervals often do not rule out economically large 
effects in either direction, although we are able to reject equality of the effective 
treatments and the ineffective ones. The second is external validity. This is one of only 
two loan repayment message studies we know of, and taken together the two studies 
already present an important puzzle. Cadena et al find that an SMS image of their bank 
does increase repayment on average. We do not find that text messages mentioning the 
bank increase repayment on average. Is this difference due to variation across the two 
studies in borrower characteristics? In credit market characteristics? In ICT market 
characteristics? In lender practices? These questions highlight the need for formulating 
and testing different theories about mechanisms underlying messaging effects, and for 
testing these theories within settings when theory predicts such heterogeneity, and across 
different settings when theory predicts differential effects across underlying contextual 
factors and market conditions. 
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the setup of the 
experiment. Section 3 presents the results and discussion. Section 4 briefly concludes.  
 
II. Experimental Setting and Design 
We worked with two for-profit banks to design and implement an SMS loan 
repayment experiment on individual liability microloan borrowers, Green Bank and 
Mabitac. Green Bank operates in both urban and rural areas of the Visayas and Mindanao 
regions. It is the 5th largest bank by Gross Loan Portfolio in the Philippines.3 Mabitac 
                                                
3 Source: www.mixmarket.org, accessed 2/7/2012. 
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operates in both urban and rural areas of the Luzon region. It is the 34th largest bank in 
the Philippines. Both banks are among the leading microlenders in the Philippines. 
The Philippines is a suitable environment for a study of responses to SMS messaging. 
Anecdotally known as the “texting capital of the world”, cellphone use is widespread: 
81% of the population had a cellphone subscription in 2009,4 and texting is an especially 
popular method of communication because of its low cost, generally about 2 cents a 
message. Approximately 1.4 billion SMS are sent by Filipinos each day. 
We lack much demographic data on the specific borrowers in our sample, but prior 
work with a different bank with similar microfinance operations suggests that borrowers 
are likely predominantly middle-aged female microentrepreneurs, and likely about 
average with respect to education and household income relative (Karlan and Zinman 
2011). This other bank however is located in urban and peri-urban Manila, versus the 
urban and rural setting of the two partner banks from this study. 
Summary statistics for the loans in our sample are presented in Table 2. The average 
loan is approximately $400 USD, repaid weekly over a 16 to 20 week term at around 
30% APR. Microloan charge-off rates are typically around 3% for the banks in this study. 
Late payments are common: 29% of weekly loan payments are made at least one day 
late in the control group, and 16% are a week late. 14% of loans are not paid in full 
within 30 days of the maturity date. Late payments and delinquencies are costly for the 
banks because they trigger additional monitoring, accounting, and legal actions. Mabitac 
begins actively following up on late payments 3 days after the due date, while Greenbank 
begins after 7 days. Late payments and delinquencies can also be costly for the borrower: 
borrowers are charged late fees, may be subject to legal action, and their creditworthiness 
and ability to secure future loans is decreased. So the focus of the experiment was to 
improve timely repayment of the weekly loan installments.  
We designed the experiment to test the effects of three different dimensions of a 
messaging strategy. One dimension is whether to send messages at all: borrowers were 
assigned to either treatment (receive a message weekly, for the entire loan term) or 
control (no message). 
                                                
4 Source: World Bank Development Indicators Database; accessed 8/27/2011. 
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A second dimension is messaging content. Each message was randomly assigned a 
2x2 combination of “loss vs. gain framing” and “personalization”, producing the four 
scripts shown in Table 1. All message variants included some boilerplate content: the 
bank name, “pls pay your loan on time”, and “If paid, pls ignore msg. Tnx”. Loss-framed 
messages started with “To avoid penalty…”. Gain-framed messages started with “To 
have a good standing...”. The personalization treatment varied whether the client's name 
(“From [bankname]: [client name],…) or the account officer’s name (“From [AO’s 
name] of [bankname]:….”) was included in the first 2 or 3 words of the message. 
The third dimension tested here is timing: we randomly and independently varied 
whether each of the borrower’s messages were sent 2 days before the scheduled payment 
date, the day before the scheduled payment date, or the day of the scheduled payment 
date.5 Borrowers received the same content and timing each week, for the term of the 
loan; i.e., we randomized at the loan level.6 
Our study sample includes 943 loans originated by Greenbank and Mabitac between 
May 2008 and March 2010, and captures about half of the individual liability microloans 
made by the two banks during this period where the client provided a cellphone number 
to the lender. We include only the first loan per client during this time period because a 
treatment that affects repayment on the first loan in turn affects the likelihood of 
subsequent loans. We exclude first loans where bank reporting errors made it impossible 
for us to randomize messaging or to match randomly assigned loans to bank data on loan 
repayment.7  
                                                
5 The randomization was set to 33% for control and 66% to treatment, equally divided between 
the 4 treatment groups. The timing treatment was independently randomized, with each three 
treatments equally likely. However, due to a coding error the final breakdown of randomization 
was 34% treatment, and then 12%, 25%, 14%, 15% to each of the four treatments instead of 17% 
each treatment group. There was no error in coding the independently randomized timing 
treatment. Table 2 tests for balance across treatment arms in baseline loan characteristics, and we 
find no evidence of imbalance. 
6 Other mechanics of the randomization: the research team received weekly reports of clients with 
payments due in the following week from each participating branch. We randomized clients the 
first time they appeared in these weekly reports. Once randomized into treatment, clients received 
weekly text messages until their loan maturity date. The text messages were automatically sent 
using SMS server software.  
7 We randomized a total of 1703 loans. 138 loans were not reported to us until nearly the end of 
their repayment cycle. Another 305 loans that did get random assignments could not be matched 
to repayment data because one of the banks changed its database midstream and did not create a 
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The top three rows of Table 2 check whether the characteristics of the 943 loans in 
our study sample are balanced across control (N=312) vs. treatment (N=631), vs. each 
content treatment arm (total N=631), and vs. each timing treatment arm (total N=631). 
The three characteristics we observe for each loan are amount, term, and number of 
weeks in our experiment (this number of weeks equals the number of weekly repayment 
observations we observe for that loan, and also the number of messages a treated loan 
was sent). None of the pairwise comparisons between control and treatment produce a 
statistically significant difference (differences not shown in table). We also regress 
treatment assignments on the three loan characteristics and fail to reject equality in each 
of the six regressions; as the table shows, the smallest p-value in any of those regressions 
is 0.17.  
 
III. Treatment Effects of Messaging on Loan Repayment  
The bottom panel of Table 2 presents simple means comparisons for outcome data: 
five different measures of late loan repayment. Stars indicate a pairwise significant 
difference between a treatment arm and the control group. These comparisons preview 
one of our main regression results from Section 3 below: only the messages containing 
the account officer’s name reliably reduce delinquency relative to the control group. We 
find large and statistically significant reductions for all five measures.8 
We also estimate treatment effects using OLS equations of the form: 
Yit =  α + βTi + δXi + ε 
 
Where Y is a measure of late payment for loan (or, equivalently, client) i at time t. T is 
either an indicator for whether messages were sent for this loan, or the complete vector of 
                                                                                                                                            
unique identifier for tracking/matching loans across the old and new database. Treatment 
assignment is uncorrelated with whether we could match to administrative data (p-value 0.53). 
One loan was randomized twice, and 316 loans were subsequent loans of clients already in our 
study and hence dropped from the final analysis. This leaves a final sample of 943 loans. 
8 We also use an alternative measure of late payment: whether the client missed a payment in the 
calendar week, defined as Sunday-Saturday. If loan payments are made late they are applied to 
the most outstanding installment first, so this alternative measure could capture whether a client is 
making regular payments even if they remain in arrears. Under this measure, no payment is made 
at all in 19% of weeks when a payment is due. The empirical results are robust to using this 
alternative measure of late payment (Appendix Table 1).  
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treatment categories capturing assignment to one of the four content arms (loss or gain X 
client name or AO name) and to one of the three timing arms. In either setup the control 
group is the omitted category for T. X is a vector of account officer and month-year (of 
the Y observation) fixed effects. In specifications where we have multiple weekly 
observations per loan we cluster the standard errors by loan.  
Table 3 presents results for three different measures of late repayment (three more are 
considered in Appendix Table 1). Late and More Than 7 Days Late are based on the 
timeliness of the required weekly payments; for these outcomes the unit of observation is 
the loan-week, and we only include weeks starting with the week a bank first reported a 
loan to us and we randomly assigned that loan to treatment or control. The other 
outcome, Late 30 Days After Loan Maturity, is measured at a single point in time, and 
hence the unit of observation is the loan.  
The first cell in each block in Table 3 presents the estimated treatment effect of 
receiving any messaging on each of the three outcomes. None of the point estimates are 
statistically significant, but all three are negative (indicating reduced delinquency) and 
the confidence intervals do not rule out economically meaningful effects (the control 
group means are reproduced near the bottom of the table for reference/scaling). 
Focusing on Panel A of Table 3, the next four rows present treatment effect estimates 
for each of the four content combinations relative to the control (no messaging) group.  
Neither of the client name messages (whether gain- or loss-framed) produced statistically 
significant effects, and five of their six coefficients are positive (indicating increased 
delinquency). 
Appendix Table 2 presents results for loss- and gain-frame relative to control 
(grouping the loss-frame bank-named with the loss-framed account officer-named 
message, etc.). None of the six coefficients are significantly different from the control 
group, although there is a bit of evidence that negative framing is (more) effective: all 
three of its coefficients are negative, and the p-values on the difference between negative 
and positive framing are 0.08, 0.19, and 0.26. 
Returning to Panel A of Table 3, we see that each of the six estimates for account 
officer-(AO-) named messages (whether gain- or loss-framed) indicate late and missed 
weekly payments. The positive-frame AO coefficient is negative and significant in all 
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three cases. The third column in each block presents a dummy for any message with the 
AO name. This is also negative and statistically significant in three cases. In each case 
the point estimate on the AO-named message dummy implies substantial reductions: 24% 
in late payments, 34% in 7 days late, and 41% in unpaid 30 days after maturity. 
Conversations with bank management indicate that reductions of these magnitudes would 
produce cost savings that greatly exceed the cost of messaging. 
What explains the effectiveness of the AO messages? The fact that repayment 
responds to messaging at all suggests the presence of some sort of limited 
enforcement/moral hazard; i.e., of some sort of elasticity of repayment effort (broadly 
defined to include strategic default and perhaps project choice; see, e.g., Karlan and 
Zinman (2009)) that is not captured by observable risk and that hence is not priced on the 
margin. A more precise question is how the AO message triggers increased borrower 
repayment effort and thereby mitigates moral hazard. Prior work suggests two possible 
channels. Work on relationship lending suggests that the AO message may signal 
increased intent to monitor the borrower (screening/selection is not in play here, since 
loans are not assigned to treatment until after origination). Work on social obligation and 
reciprocity suggests that the AO message may trigger better behavior from borrowers 
who have a relationship with the AO in the lay sense (not the asymmetric information 
sense): a personal or professional relationship. 
Table 4 explores whether the AO messages operate on borrower monitoring 
expectations and/or lay-sense relationships by running the analysis separately for clients 
who entered the sample as first- time borrowers with the bank vs. for clients who entered 
the sample as pre-existing borrowers with the bank. (We continue here to limit our 
analysis to the first loan a borrower obtained during the time period when we were 
randomizing.) 
Our hypothesis is that new borrowers know less about AO monitoring than 
experienced borrowers, and hence that new borrowers should infer more from the AO 
message if in fact the message works by signaling intent to monitor closely. So if the 
message works by changing expectations about monitoring, we would expect greater 
reductions for first-time borrowers. Table 4 shows that the opposite is true. The AO 
message produces significant reductions only for repeat borrowers, and although the 
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confidence intervals for the first-time borrowers sub-sample do not rule out significant 
reductions (or increases) in delinquency, the differences in the AO message treatment 
effects across the two sub-samples are statistically significant in all 3 cases. It seems that 
the AO-named message is actually more powerful for pre-existing borrowers, suggesting 
that it is the “personal touch” and not signaling that matters. This interpretation makes 
sense considering that nearly all repeat borrowers (an estimated 80%) have the same loan 
officer across loans. 
Returning to Table 3, Panel B presents treatment effect estimates for the timing 
treatments relative to control. Clients assigned to messages were sent them every week, 
on either: the day the payment was due, the day before, or 2 days before. This timing 
treatment was independently randomized after the initial randomization to either the 
control group or one of the four message scripts. We do not find any statistically 
significant evidence that a specific timing treatment is effective relative to control, or 
relatively effective compared to the other timing treatments. 
 
IV. Conclusion 
This paper presents the results of a simple randomized trial sending text messages to 
individual liability microfinance clients from two banks in the Philippines. We do not 
find an overall treatment effect: the average message does not significantly improve 
repayment. Nor do we find strong evidence of (differential) impacts from loss vs. gain 
frames or message timing. However, messages that mention the loan officer’s name 
significantly, substantially, and robustly improve repayment rates relative to messages 
that mention the client’s name and/or to the no-message control group. This effect is only 
significant, and significantly stronger, for clients who enter the sample having borrowed 
from the bank (and hence been serviced by the loan officer) before, suggesting that the 
messages trigger feelings of social obligation/reciprocity. That is messages seem to work 
by triggering personal relationships rather than by signaling intent to monitor closely. 
This study highlights several directions for future research. One is the importance of 
replication, ideally with large samples that permit sharper inferences on null effects.  A 
second is further interplay between theory and empirics about when, why, and how 
messaging content matters. A third is further exchange between theory and empirics 
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about when, why, and how the effects of messaging and ICT differ across different 
market and cultural settings. A fourth is on the interaction between ICT and 
personalization. The study here suggests that there need not be a trade-off between 
technology and personalization; indeed, it may be the case that attuning ICT to personal 
relationships can reinforce relationship lending as traditionally defined. 
 11 
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Table 1. Wording of text messages
AO name
Positive
From [aoname] of [bankname]: To have a good standing,
pls pay your loan on time. If paid, pls ignore msg. Tnx
Negative
From [aoname] of [bankname]: To avoid penalty pls pay
your loan on time. If paid, pls ignore msg. Tnx.
Client name
Positive
From [bankname]: [name], To have a good standing, pls
pay your loan on time. If paid, pls ignore msg. Tnx.
Negative
From [bankname]: [name], To avoid penalty pls pay your
loan on time. If paid, pls ignore msg. Tnx.
Table 2. Summary Statistics (mean/standard error)
Content Treatment Timing Treatment
Control Treatment SMS addressed to client SMS signed by account officer Days SMS sent before payment due
Positive Negative Positive Negative 0 1 2
Baseline loan characteristics
Loan size (peso) 22141 25331 23040 25852 26485 25386 25571 25173 25227
(1530) (1488) (1894) (2614) (3286) (3676) (2228) (2301) (3094)
Loan term (weeks) 19.1 19.7 19.0 20.8 19.0 19.0 20.1 19.6 19.3
(0.7) (0.5) (1.0) (0.9) (1.0) (0.8) (0.8) (0.8) (0.8)
Number of weeks in experiment 10.6 10.6 10.2 10.6 10.9 10.6 10.6 10.9 10.4
(0.3) (0.2) (0.4) (0.4) (0.4) (0.5) (0.4) (0.4) (0.3)
p-value from F-test verifying orthogonality 0.587 0.718 0.170 0.856 0.331 0.662
Outcome variables: proportion of all weekly payments
Late 0.287 0.296 0.302 0.335* 0.231* 0.291 0.292 0.302 0.293
(0.018) (0.013) (0.032) (0.022) (0.026) (0.027) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023)
More than 1 day late 0.252 0.251 0.270 0.280 0.190** 0.249 0.248 0.257 0.249
(0.018) (0.013) (0.031) (0.021) (0.025) (0.026) (0.022) (0.023) (0.021)
More than 7 days late 0.156 0.153 0.175 0.171 0.110* 0.148 0.154 0.156 0.148
(0.016) (0.011) (0.029) (0.019) (0.022) (0.024) (0.019) (0.021) (0.020)
Outcome variables:loan at maturity
Any unpaid balance at maturity 0.235 0.217 0.241 0.260 0.134*** 0.210 0.210 0.210 0.229
(0.024) (0.016) (0.040) (0.029) (0.029) (0.034) (0.028) (0.029) (0.028)
Any unpaid balance at maturity + 30 days 0.135 0.098 0.121 0.134 0.035*** 0.084* 0.103 0.082* 0.108
(0.019) (0.012) (0.030) (0.022) (0.016) (0.023) (0.021) (0.020) (0.021)
Number loans 311 632 116 231 142 143 214 195 223
Stars indicate a statistically significant difference between a treatment arm and the control group (* 90%, ** 95%, *** 99%). P-value of F test for random assignment on loan
characteristics includes controls for account officer and month-year fixed effects.
Table 3. OLS Treatment Effect Estimates for Messaging, Content, and Timing
Late More than 7 days late Any unpaid balance at maturity + 30day
Unit of observation Weekly payment Weekly payment Loan
Panel A: Content
Any SMS -0.007 0.024 -0.004 0.020 -0.024 -0.000
(0.021) (0.025) (0.019) (0.023) (0.023) (0.027)
Positive frame X SMS addressed to client 0.008 0.010 0.005
(0.036) (0.031) (0.035)
Negative frame X SMS addressed to client 0.032 0.025 -0.003
(0.028) (0.025) (0.031)
Positive frame X SMS signed by account officer -0.065** -0.044* -0.078***
(0.028) (0.024) (0.025)
Negative frame X SMS signed by account officer -0.025 -0.021 -0.029
(0.028) (0.023) (0.031)
AO name -0.069*** -0.052** -0.053**
(0.024) (0.021) (0.024)
Panel B: Timing
Any SMS -0.007 0.024 -0.004 0.020 -0.024 -0.000
(0.021) (0.025) (0.019) (0.023) (0.023) (0.027)
SMS sent day payment due -0.011 -0.000 -0.012
(0.027) (0.025) (0.030)
SMS sent 1 day before payment due -0.008 -0.012 -0.037
(0.027) (0.023) (0.027)
SMS sent 2 days before payment due -0.003 0.000 -0.025
(0.027) (0.024) (0.028)
AO name -0.069*** -0.052** -0.053**
(0.024) (0.021) (0.024)
AO FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Month-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mean control group 0.291 0.291 0.291 0.158 0.158 0.158 0.135 0.135 0.135
Number repayments 9994 9994 9994 9994 9994 9994 . . .
Number loans 943 943 943 943 943 943 943 943 943
OLS regressions with standard errors clustered at the loan level. Stars indicate statistical significance (* 90%, ** 95%, *** 99%). Dependent variables are dummy variables for
measures of late payment or outstanding balance at maturity. All regressions include controls for account officer and month-year fixed effects.
Table 4. Monitoring or Reciprocity: First Time Clients vs Pre-Existing Clients
Late More 7 days late Unpaid at maturity + 30day
Unit of observation Weekly payment Weekly payment Loan
Panel A: Clients who are first time borrowers from bank
Any SMS 0.005 0.014 0.018 0.027 -0.003 0.009
(0.031) (0.037) (0.028) (0.033) (0.035) (0.040)
Positive frame X SMS addressed to client -0.080 -0.038 0.000
(0.053) (0.042) (0.049)
Negative frame X SMS addressed to client 0.054 0.055 0.012
(0.040) (0.038) (0.046)
Positive frame X SMS signed by account officer -0.042 -0.027 -0.072
(0.044) (0.037) (0.046)
Negative frame X SMS signed by account officer 0.025 0.036 0.030
(0.043) (0.035) (0.049)
AO name -0.022 -0.021 -0.027
(0.038) (0.032) (0.040)
Mean control group 0.335 0.335 0.335 0.178 0.178 0.178 0.123 0.123 0.123
Number repayments 4576 4576 4576 4576 4576 4576 . . .
Number loans 464 464 464 464 464 464 464 464 464
Panel B: Clients who have borrowed from bank before
Any SMS -0.029 0.020 -0.032 0.007 -0.060* -0.021
(0.027) (0.033) (0.025) (0.031) (0.033) (0.040)
Positive frame X SMS addressed to client 0.059 0.022 -0.002
(0.046) (0.043) (0.051)
Negative frame X SMS addressed to client -0.003 -0.002 -0.033
(0.038) (0.035) (0.047)
Positive frame X SMS signed by account officer -0.094*** -0.079** -0.110***
(0.036) (0.034) (0.034)
Negative frame X SMS signed by account officer -0.061* -0.067** -0.095**
(0.033) (0.028) (0.042)
AO name -0.100*** -0.080*** -0.083***
(0.031) (0.029) (0.032)
Mean control group 0.248 0.248 0.248 0.137 0.137 0.137 0.148 0.148 0.148
Number repayments 5418 5418 5418 5418 5418 5418 . . .
Number loans 485 485 485 485 485 485 479 479 479
p-value from F-test for equality of AO name coefficient over client type 0.009 0.041 0.057
AO FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Month-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
OLS regressions with standard errors clustered at the loan level. Stars indicate statistical significance (* 90%, ** 95%, *** 99%). Dependent variables are dummy variables
for measures of late payment or outstanding balance at maturity. All regressions include controls for account officer and month-year fixed effects.. P-value from F-test that the
coefficients are the same from first-time and pre-existing clients, computed by estimating a pooled model with interaction term.
Appendix Table 1. OLS Treatment Effect Estimates for Three Additional Repayment Measures
More 1 day late Missed week Unpaid at maturity
Unit of observation Weekly payment Weekly payment Loan
Panel A: Content
Any SMS -0.007 0.023 -0.001 0.021 -0.011 0.019
(0.020) (0.025) (0.016) (0.020) (0.029) (0.035)
Positive frame X SMS addressed to client 0.018 0.016 0.044
(0.034) (0.027) (0.047)
Negative frame X SMS addressed to client 0.026 0.024 0.005
(0.028) (0.022) (0.039)
Positive frame X SMS signed by account officer -0.060** -0.043* -0.080**
(0.027) (0.022) (0.038)
Negative frame X SMS signed by account officer -0.025 -0.012 -0.012
(0.026) (0.021) (0.041)
AO name -0.065*** -0.049*** -0.065*
(0.023) (0.019) (0.034)
Panel B: Timing
Any SMS -0.007 0.023 -0.001 0.021 -0.011 0.019
(0.020) (0.025) (0.016) (0.020) (0.029) (0.035)
SMS sent day payment due -0.012 -0.005 -0.007
(0.027) (0.022) (0.038)
SMS sent 1 day before payment due -0.010 -0.006 -0.013
(0.026) (0.020) (0.038)
SMS sent 2 days before payment due 0.001 0.008 -0.012
(0.026) (0.021) (0.036)
AO name -0.065*** -0.049*** -0.065*
(0.023) (0.019) (0.034)
AO FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Month-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mean control group 0.252 0.252 0.252 0.185 0.185 0.185 0.235 0.235 0.235
Number repayments 9994 9994 9994 9994 9994 9994 . . .
Number loans 943 943 943 943 943 943 943 943 943
OLS regressions with standard errors clustered at the loan level. Stars indicate statistical significance (* 90%, ** 95%, *** 99%). Unpaid at maturity is a dummy variable indicating
whether loan has been fully repaid. All regressions include controls for account officer and month-year fixed effects. Missed week is a missed calendar week.
Appendix Table 2. OLS Treatment Effects by Framing Treatment
Late More than 7 days late Any unpaid balance at maturity + 30day
Unit of observation Weekly payment Weekly payment Loan
Positive framing 0.010 0.007 -0.014
(0.023) (0.021) (0.026)
Negative framing -0.033 -0.020 -0.040
(0.025) (0.022) (0.025)
AO FE Yes Yes Yes
Month-Year FE Yes Yes Yes
P-value from F-test for equality of framing coefficients 0.082 0.188 0.259
Mean control group 0.291 0.158 0.135
Number repayments 9994 9994 .
Number loans 943 943 943
OLS regressions with standard errors clustered at the loan level. Stars indicate statistical significance (* 90%, ** 95%, *** 99%). Dependent variables are dummy variables
for measures of late payment or outstanding balance at maturity. All regressions include controls for account officer and month-year fixed effects. P-value from F-test that the
coefficients on negative framing and positive framing are the same.
